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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






C. G. B. 
 
 
    v. 
 
AIDA SANTA LUCIA;  
VAROUJAN KHOROZIAN;  
KYLE KHOROZIAN;  
DEREK KHOROZIAN, 
 
        Defendant-Appellants    
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-03401) 
District Judge: Hon. Susan D. Wigenton 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 14, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges. 
  






                                              
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 






SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
Defendants Aida Santa Lucia, Varoujan Khorozian, Kyle Khorozian, and Derek 
Khorozian (collectively, “Defendants”) appeal the District Court’s order (1) denying their 
third request for a continuance of an evidentiary hearing to resolve an allegation that 
Plaintiff C.G.B. breached a settlement agreement and (2) granting C.G.B.’s motion to 
enforce the settlement agreement and denying Defendants’ motion to rescind or reform it.  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
I 
C.G.B. sued Defendants for violations of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 2000, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595, and related state law claims.  
C.G.B. alleged that she was a former teacher in Cameroon who was trafficked into the 
United States to perform forced labor.  The parties eventually settled the dispute.  
According to C.G.B., however, Defendants later attempted to add new material terms to 
the settlement agreement.1  Consequently, C.G.B. moved to enforce the settlement 
agreement.   
In response, Defendants asserted that C.G.B. breached the confidentiality clause of 
the settlement agreement by disclosing the settlement amount, and that this breach 
warranted either the agreement’s rescission or reformation.  In support of their cross-
                                              
1 In particular, Defendants sought to add provisions (1) requiring C.G.B. to sign a 
French translation of the agreement; (2) prohibiting C.G.B. from providing testimony in 
other cases against Defendants; (3) allowing “all parties” to use discovery produced in 
this lawsuit; and (4) requiring that C.G.B. voluntarily dismiss this lawsuit before 
receiving the settlement checks.  ECF No. 98 at 1-2. 





motion to rescind or reform the settlement agreement, Defendants included an affidavit 
from a Cameroonian government official, Emmanuel Anyang Asongwed, who stated that 
the Cameroonian government learned about the claims in the case and the resulting 
settlement.        
On October 3, 2017, the Magistrate Judge ordered the parties to appear for a 
hearing on October 13, 2017, so Defendants could present evidence of C.G.B.’s 
purported breach of the settlement agreement.  Two days later, certain Defendants 
requested a continuance of the October 13, 2017 hearing.  Defendants explained that 
witnesses from Cameroon needed time to obtain their visas and travel to the United States 
for the hearing.  The Magistrate Judge denied the request, observing that Defendants’ 
proposed witnesses lacked “first-hand personal knowledge of [C.G.B.’s] alleged 
disclosure of the confidential terms of the parties’ settlement.”  ECF No. 145.  In 
response, Defendants represented that two Cameroonian nationals, Asongwed and 
Nicholas Atangana, had “direct knowledge” of C.G.B.’s disclosure of confidential 
information.  App. 205.  The Magistrate Judge then granted the request, adjourned the 
hearing until October 16, 2017, and informed Defendants that the Court would “agree to 
take [the Cameroonian witnesses’] testimony via Skype or some other remote means.”  
ECF No. 176 at 13.   
Thereafter, Defendants requested a second continuance based on the witnesses’ 
inability to access videoconferencing equipment or to secure visas in time to attend the 
hearing.  The Magistrate Judge continued the evidentiary hearing once more to October 
26, 2017.  Cognizant of the potential technological issues of remote testimony, the 





Magistrate Judge noted that the continuance “should give plenty of time to arrange to get 
on a webcam on a laptop . . . .”  ECF No. 177 at 11.  
At the start of the October 26, 2017 evidentiary hearing, Defendants informed the 
Court that Asongwed was present to testify, but they requested a third continuance so that 
Atangana could testify at a later date.  According to Defendants, Atangana could not 
testify remotely by videoconference because he went to the United States Embassy in 
Cameroon to obtain a visa.  The Magistrate Judge denied the request because Defendants 
provided “no reason for Mr. Atangana to make himself unavailable to testify remotely at 
the hearing in order to seek a visa to travel to the United States to testify in person.”  
App. 033.     
Defendants then presented Asongwed’s testimony.  Asongwed testified that 
C.G.B. called him, years after the only time they met, to discuss the money she received 
from her settlement with Defendants.  When the Court asked if he knew that it was 
C.G.B. who called him, Asongwed testified that he was uncertain, but when questioned 
by Defendants’ counsel, he said that the call was with C.G.B.  Asongwed was also 
questioned about how C.G.B. came to contact him and confronted with contradictions 
between his testimony and his affidavit.  No other evidence was offered to support 
Defendants’ assertion that C.G.B. disclosed confidential information about the 
settlement.    
The Magistrate Judge rejected Asongwed’s testimony.  The Magistrate Judge 
found, among other things, that Asongwed was not credible because his testimony was 
inconsistent with his affidavit, he did not provide a reason as to why C.G.B. called him or 





how she obtained his telephone number, he could not identify C.G.B. as the caller with 
certainty, his testimony was evasive, and Defendants and their agents “influenced 
improperly” his testimony.  App. 031.  As a result, the Magistrate Judge recommended 
granting C.G.B.’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement and denying Defendants’ 
motion to rescind or reform it.   
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.  
Defendants appeal. 
II2 
Defendants argue that the District Court erred in (1) denying Defendants’ third 
request for a continuance; and (2) denying their cross-motion for rescission or 
reformation of the settlement agreement and granting C.G.B.’s motion to enforce it.  We 
consider each argument in turn. 
A 
“A trial court’s decision to deny a continuance will only be reversed on a showing 
of abuse of discretion.”  Paullet v. Howard, 634 F.2d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 1980).  Indeed, 
“[w]e will not interfere with a trial court’s control of its docket except upon the clearest 
showing that the procedures have resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to the 
complaining litigant.”  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 





Defendants sought a third continuance so that Atangana could appear in person or 
by videoconference to testify.   The Magistrate Judge had previously granted two 
continuances, which gave Defendants nearly two additional weeks to coordinate their 
witnesses’ appearances or, alternatively, present such testimony by videoconference.  
Thus, Defendants had sufficient time and means to adduce the testimony.   
Defendants sought a third continuance at the start of the October 26, 2017 hearing, 
explaining that Atangana decided to visit the embassy to obtain his visa rather than make 
himself available to appear by video.  Defendants gave “no reason” why Atangana could 
not testify by videoconference as permitted by the Magistrate Judge, App. 033, and any 
harm Defendants suffered from his absence was based on his decision to not participate 
remotely.  Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge acted well within her discretion in denying 
the last-minute request for a third continuance.    
B 
We next examine the order granting C.G.B.’s motion to enforce the settlement 
agreement and denying Defendants’ cross-motion to rescind or reform it.  In reviewing 
the enforcement of a settlement agreement, we evaluate the district court’s factual 
findings for clear error, Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991); Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the 
trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility”), and we review the court’s 
legal conclusions de novo, Covington v. Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216, 218 (3d 
Cir. 2004).   





Defendants’ only argument on appeal is that their witness, Asongwed, testified to 
C.G.B.’s discussion of the settlement amount and that C.G.B. provided no evidence to the 
contrary.  This argument fails for two related reasons.  First, the Magistrate Judge found 
that Asongwed’s testimony was not credible.  “[A]ssessments of witness credibility . . . 
are wrapped up in evaluations of demeanor that a trial judge is in a better position to 
decide,” and we defer to such assessments unless there is clear error.  United States v. 
Brown, 631 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2011).  The Magistrate Judge’s negative views about 
Asongwed’s credibility were well supported.  For example, Asongwed first said that 
C.G.B. called him to discuss the settlement amount, but when the Magistrate Judge 
pressed him for further details, he said, “I will not say with certainty” that it was C.G.B. 
on the phone.  ECF No. 209 at 20.  Thus, the Magistrate Judge had a basis to conclude 
that Defendants produced no credible evidence that C.G.B. disclosed the settlement 
amount to Asongwed or anyone else.  Additional support for this conclusion comes from 
Asongwed’s affidavit, which stated that the Government of Cameroon “came to learn of 
the settlement of a lawsuit . . . and of the claims that [C.G.B.] made” in March 2017, but 
made no mention of any contact with C.G.B.  ECF No. 102-3 at 2.  Furthermore, the 
Magistrate Judge noted problems with Asongwed’s demeanor and equivocation when 
testifying.  Based on these factually supported credibility determinations, the decision to 
discount Asongwed’s testimony was not clear error.         
Second, in the absence of any credible evidence that C.G.B. breached the 
confidentiality clause of the settlement agreement, it was not error for the District Court 
to grant C.G.B.’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement and deny Defendants’ 





motion to rescind or reform it.  Defendants had the burden of providing “clear and 
convincing proof” that the agreement should be rescinded.3  Nolan ex rel. Nolan v. Lee 
Ho, 577 A.2d 143, 146 (N.J. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Defendants 
sought to rescind or reform the agreement because C.G.B. allegedly breached the 
agreement by discussing its monetary terms.  Because it was not error for the District 
Court to discredit the only evidence adduced on this point, and Defendants provided no 
other evidence to support their request for relief, they did not make the requisite showing 
to justify rescission or reformation.  See Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 951 A.2d 947, 
961-62 (N.J. 2008) (explaining New Jersey’s policy in favor of settlements and that 
courts should honor settlements “absent compelling circumstances.”) (quoting Nolan, 577 
A.2d at 472)).  Accordingly, the District Court appropriately granted C.G.B.’s motion to 
enforce the settlement agreement and denied Defendants’ motion to rescind or reform it.  
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
                                              
3 The parties agree that New Jersey contract law governs the dispute.     
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